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Playing Favorites
Richard Delgado*
Editors
Texas Law Review
University of Texas School of Law
727 East 26th Street
Austin, TX 78705
Dear Editors:
You asked for my favorite judicial opinion. It's City of Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co.,' the "minority set-aside case."
Are you surprised? Perhaps you thought I would choose Brown v.
Board of Education, Metro Broadcasting, Gideon v. Winwright, New York
Times v. Sullivan, or one of the other famous liberal breakthrough cases.
Crits, though, are funny people. We have unusual criteria. Many of us
hold law in less reverence than some. Hence, asking us what our favorite
judicial opinion is is a little like asking us what is our favorite pothole. I
recently argued that radical reformers ought to think of law much as we
think of any other social institution-for example, the highway
department-helpful at some times and for certain purposes, but less so at
others. Thus to speak about the rule of law in exalted terms (as many do)
is a little bit like speaking of the grandeur of highway procedure, one's
favorite mixture of asphalt, or one's favorite pothole.
I named this approach legal instrumentalism. 2 If one looks at law and
judging in this way, many of the usual criteria do not make sense.
Aesthetic criteria, for example, practically drop out. It's satisfying, of
course, to read opinions that are elegant, contain no misspellings, and have
good transitions from one point to another. But seeing law in instrumental
terms, as a means to an end, puts things in a new light. And what of
reasoned elaboration or clarity of moral impulse? Again, good things to
have going for you, but one quickly remembers the tight reasoning and
moral sonorousness of Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
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or how neatly Herb Wechsler's famous article skewers Brown v. Board of
Education. One lawyer's normative sonorousness (for a fee) can be made
to match anybody else's normative sonorousness in the opposite direction:
I can puff norm X just as piously as you can non-X. (I can even puff
nihilism, the usual banner under which liberals try to put this normativity
critique down. How's this: "Nihilism really means asserting banal,
predictable homilies that end up being perfectly empty, circular, and selfreferential when most of the cruelty that goes on in today's world is
perpetuated by faceless bureaucracies that don't care a fig for you and me
and are perfectly amoral and profit-oriented.")
You might think, given my embrace of legal instrumentalism, that I
would applaud the new theory, legal pragmatism: A case is good if it
produces good results. But things are not always that simple. The Crit is
apt to think about all those cases that produced only a momentary advance,
followed by resounding retreat. Brown v. Board of Education caused
jubilation among civil rights activists. There were rejoicing, relief,
anticipation of better days to come, followed, of course, by regression.
The South mounted formidable resistance. Lower-court judges construed
the case narrowly. Administrators dragged their feet. Fifteen years later,
hardly more black schoolchildren attended integrated schools than did at the
time the case was decided. Brown may even have made matters worse:
Liberals relaxed, believing the battle won ("the Court has spoken") or
moved on to other campaigns, such as saving the whales. In the meantime,
conservatives redoubled their resistance, believing the Court had given
away the store to undeserving minorities.3
Crits also have developed the notion of the contradiction-closing case.
At various times, the gap between our national ideals (of brotherhood,
equality, respect for persons, etc.) and current reality becomes so great that
the court system hands down a decision that seems to close the gap, thus
stabilizing everything. The right level of racism (for example) is not zero,
but a certain medium level. More than that would, invite disruption, too
little would forfeit important psychic and pecuniary benefits for the
empowered group. Law is like a homeostat, assuring that there is just the
right amount of racism, classism, and sexism. Thus, even when a
seemingly helpful decision is handed down, we Crits ask the systemic
questions: How will this decision fit in? What will it mean in the long
4
term?
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One thing5 most Crits agree is desirable is that everyone-law
students, professors, legal academics, judges-acquire a radical critique of
how the legal system works. Not only is it fun to do, it's intellectually
respectable; and for progressive practitioners it provides, I believe, a kind
of psychic armoring against the inevitable disappointment when: conservative judges treat you rudely; cases that should win, lose; cases that
should lose, win; clients lie to you; and the system changes the rules just
when you thought you were starting to get somewhere. The goal of
achieving a stone-cold sober understanding of how things work also helps
you guard against judge-worship, opinion-worship, and getting overly
comforted and seduced by nice noise.
My choice, then, is Croson, a messy, fragmented 1989 opinion that
struck down a minority set-aside program requiring prime contractors to
award a certain percentage of construction contracts to minority-owned
businesses in a city that was heavily black but had a history of white
domination in the construction industry. Croson is an exemplary opinion
because it shows readers how power works, and also which way the
country's winds are starting to blow. In reversing Fullilove6 with little
explanation on a very similar point, the Supreme Court foreshadowed what
it would do in a host of later cases regarding minority redistricting,
seniority plans, employment tests, highway construction contracts, and a
host of other issues. It reintroduced tropes and moves we thought had
passed into history-the innocent white victim, neutral principles, the
requirements of intent and a direct link between victim and perpetrator.
A radical departure in tone, reasoning, and result from Warren Court
decisions, Croson serves as a bellwether for what we may expect in the
future. It provides a quick glimpse of the iron fist in the velvet glove. It
tells us (if we did not know already) that the heyday of civil rights is over.
Though law usually lags a little behind society, with Brown v. Board
of Education the Supreme Court went out a little ahead of the time's social
consensus. And with Croson, the Court entered the anti-affirmative action
battle a little ahead of the conservative rush that was to come. As with
Brown, it led, but in the opposite direction, foreshadowing by a few years
Adarand, the California Civil Rights Initiative, the California Regents
action, rulings challenging race-based scholarships, and bills currently in
Congress cutting back or eliminating preferences based on race, even if
they have a specifically remedial purpose. Croson not only served as an
indication of things to come, it also enabled the Left to begin asking a
more troubling question: Why are conservatives trying to eliminate
affirmative action entirely, instead of merely cutting it back (as they have

5. Here comes my criterion!
6. Fulilovev. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

1226

Texas Law Review

been doing, for example, with women's procreative liberties)? Affirmative
action provides steady and substantial benefits for the Right. It infuriates
working-class whites, reliably delivering votes to the conservative cause.
It lets them mobilize the troops, as well as beat up on liberals, who
struggle to articulate a defense for it. It enables conservatives to appear
more principled than liberals. Yet measures like the California initiative
and cases like Croson and Adarand suggest that conservatives are now out
to destroy the program completely.
Why kill the goose that lays the golden egg? One would think that a
program that serves the conservative cause so well would be protected at
all costs. Here's one possibility: on some level, conscious or unconscious,
conservatives are trying to goad blacks until they react. How else explain
cutbacks in welfare, the spate of recent books impugning black intelligence,
the rise of Aryan supremacist groups, the demonization of the black family,
rollbacks in campus scholarships and diversity programs, the assaults on
the non-Western canon and on black voting rights? Sometime next
century, the population in the United States will shift; there will be more
black and brown people than whites. Logically, power ought then to shift
from whites to nonwhites, a situation that conservative leaders must view
with alarm. But perhaps blacks and other minorities can be prodded into
an outbreak of civil unrest. They could then be met with overpowering
force. But this time, unlike the Sixties, suppression will not be followed
by beneficent but repressive legislation. Martial law will be made easier;
new legislation will make police searches and stops easier to justify; even
more jails will be built; white communities will be guarded by walls and
watchtowers. The United States will sail into the next century a little like
South Africa under the old regime, a minority of whites keeping control
over a growing, but largely impotent, majority of blacks and latinosessentially the high tech Indian reservation that Murray and Herrnstein
describe in the final pages of The Bell Curve.7 Provoking one's opponent,
then slapping him down is one of the oldest strategies of bullies
everywhere.
In putting us on notice that we need to ask this "Why now?" question,
Croson is thus a sobering, exemplary opinion. But, as I mentioned, I have
unusual criteria.
Sincerely,
Richard Delgado
Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law
Boulder, CO
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